

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

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MEETING COLLECTION

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 24 March 1964, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. V.C. TRIVEDI

(India)

64-08199

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. J.A. de ARAUJO CASTRO
Mr. J. de CASTRO
Mr. E. HOSANNAH

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. LUKANOV
Mr. G. GHELEV
Mr. D. TEKHOV
Mr. G. YANKOV

Burma:

Mr. James BARRINGTON
U SAIN BWA
U HTOON SHEIN

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. R.M. TAIT
Mr. P.D. LEE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. ZEMLA
Mr. T. LAHODA
Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia:

Ato A. AGEDE
Ato S. TEFERRA

India:

Mr. V.C. TRIVEDI
Mr. A.S. MEHTA
Mr. K. KRISHNA RAO
Mr. G.R. SAPRA

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. E. GUIDOTTI
Mr. S. AVETTA
Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. Ernesto de SANTIAGO
Miss E. AGUILARRE
Mr. Manuel TELLO

Nigeria:

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. LOBODYCZ
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
Mr. J. GOLDBLAT

Romania:

Mr. M. MALITZA
Mr. V. DUMITRESCU
Mr. E. GLASER
Mr. N. ECOBESCU

Sweden:

Mr. P. LIND
Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD
Mr. M. STAHL

Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN
Mr. I.G. USACHEV
Mr. V.V. SHUSTOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A. FATTAH HASSAN
Mr. A. OSMAN
Mr. M. KASSEM
Mr. S.E. IBRAHIM

United Kingdom:

Sir Paul MASON
Mr. J.M. EDES
Mr. R.C. BEETHAM

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United States of America:

Mr. A.S. FISHER
Mr. A.L. RICHARDS
Mr. S. MacDONALD
Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (India): I declare open the one hundred and seventy-seventh meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Before we begin our regular business I should like to offer, on behalf of the delegation of India and on behalf of the Committee, a most warm and hearty welcome to Mr. de Araujo Castro, Foreign Minister of Brazil, who is attending the meeting this morning and will speak to us. The Foreign Minister of Brazil is no stranger to this Committee. Many of us have heard him, others have read the verbatim records and noted the valuable contributions he has made to the deliberations of this Committee. Now, in the position of eminence that he holds, he takes, we are sure, an equal interest in the vital task of disarmament. His Excellency's contributions to the deliberations of our Committee have always been outstanding, and we are all looking forward to another in that series.

I should like also to welcome Mr. Malitza, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Romania, another former colleague. From the list of speakers I see that Mr. Malitza is not to speak to us this morning; but we hope that he will have occasion to do so during his stay in Geneva.

I should like also to extend a welcome to the leader of the Polish delegation, who has recently joined us.

Mr. de ARAUJO CASTRO (Brazil): Mr. Chairman, first of all, I wish to thank you for your hearty welcome and your generous words. Indeed, I regard it as most gratifying to have the opportunity to be present at this meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

As I had the honour to participate in the Committee's proceedings during the summer months of 1962, it is only natural that I should feel prompted to take stock of the past work of the Conference and to indulge in some anticipation of its prospects. It may be that those days were not exactly the spring of hope; let us make sure that 1964 will not be the winter of despair.

In 1962 we were, so to speak, resuming a long-sustained effort towards disarmament, and the difficulties we then met were expected to be transitory,

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though perhaps inevitable in a matter of such magnitude. When the United Nations added to the former negotiating body eight new nations not directly engaged in the "cold war" military confrontation, the Organization wanted to have here an element of active mediation in order to draw closer together the opposing views, to smooth out difficulties, to suggest conciliation, to advance compromise -- to try, in short, to secure some measure of agreement.

The year 1962 was therefore the year to plough the field, to make the furrows, to select the seeds. There were, of course, some frustrating moments at which our proceedings struck us as being the quintessence of the "cold war". A cynical observer might have had the impression that each of the opposing blocs would not advance a suggestion or formalize a proposal before being satisfied that the other side would reject it outright, and that the mediating group of eight would be politically unwise to offer an idea or to present a plan before being one hundred per cent sure that both sides would emphatically and simultaneously condemn it; for agreement was, by definition, impossible.

It appeared that even the characterization of the eight Powers was subject to the vicissitudes of political semantics. One side insisted on calling them "neutrals" or "neutralists"; the other would adopt the rather factual denomination of the "eight new members" or the "eight additional members". Some of the eight accepted their characterization as non-aligned, non-committed, or non-engaged, for that matter; others, including Brazil, would resort to the careful and non-committal use of the simple numeral and just mention "the eight". In the world of 1962, as may well be the case today, semantics were becoming more important than survival.

Yet in 1963 some of the seeds germinated -- but not in our carefully-tilled field. The Moscow Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water (ENDC/100/Rev.1), the United Nations General Assembly resolution A/RES/1884 (XVIII); ENDC/117) on prohibiting the placing in orbit and the stationing in outer space of nuclear weapons, and the establishment of a direct communications link between Washington and Moscow (ENDC/97) are the three practical measures than can be considered in any way a result of this Conference. Unfortunately not one of them was directly negotiated or concluded in the Conference itself.

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Most striking and to the point is the case of the partial test ban treaty. As has been said a number of times, and as I said myself in the general debate of the eighteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly, (A/PV.1208, provisional, p.12) it is not very easy to understand why that agreement, which had been suggested here, was not negotiated and concluded here. My own delegation had, on 25 July and 17 August 1962 (ENDC/PV.61, p.36; PV.71, p.16), asked the nuclear Powers why it was not possible to come to an agreement banning tests in the atmosphere and in outer space. The three Powers that concluded the Moscow Treaty were the members, the only members, of the Sub-Committee on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests. Yet they chose to bypass the Sub-Committee and our Conference -- that is to say, the working machinery of the United Nations especially devised to cope with such problems -- and to act as though they were a nuclear directorate. In that particular case they did act in the interests of the international community as a whole, and it would be rather ungracious to raise a rather procedural point on a matter of such vital interest for mankind; but we must most strongly sustain our objections to the principle involved.

The same principle seems to have been applied to the question of the stationing of nuclear weapons in outer space. The matter was discussed here, and the delegation of Mexico even presented a well-conceived draft (ENDC/98). Yet the great Powers came to an agreement outside the Conference, and the General Assembly was simply called upon to endorse that agreement. It looked as if the nuclear Powers, unable to disarm themselves, felt called upon to disarm our Conference.

The Moscow Treaty was widely hailed as an important first step towards the relaxation of tension and a forerunner of further agreements. The year 1964 should be the year of those further steps and not the year of stalemate, which it may well turn out to be if the Conference is not in a position to overcome the present difficulties.

As this Conference began its present round of meetings, Mr. Foster, the United States representative, said on 21 January 1964:

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"In 1962 this Committee began its work. In 1963 the Committee played an important role in the first steps taken towards a safer and saner world. In 1964 my delegation is dedicated to keeping up the momentum and accelerating the forward movement. We strongly hope that this year will be the year in which we learn to walk towards peace, ... Having taken the first steps forward, let us continue." (ENDC/PV.157, p.13)

On 28 January Mrs. Myrdal, with her usual keenness of mind, said:

"... a singular challenge now stands before us: to be able to report very shortly on some tangible result by elaborating at least one measure ... of disarmament." (ENDC/PV.160, p.17).

Nearly two months have elapsed, and unfortunately it seems hardly possible to continue to speak in hopeful terms. I am not unaware that patience is one of the main ingredients of negotiation. I know that ours is a fearsome task and that our goal cannot be achieved overnight. It is a work of persuasion. Yet I see no use in our trying to delude ourselves and to imagine that we are moving forward if we are at a standstill; for there is no concealing the fact that world opinion is disappointed. Yet it would be futile or unfair to pin down and single out responsibilities of the East, or of the West, or of the eight. If we fail -- and we may fail -- the fault will fall on all eighteen of us, and we shall have to account for our failure to world public opinion. Pinning down responsibilities would be just indulging in "cold war" tactics.

The irony of it is that our frustration comes when there seems to prevail a universal consensus that armaments do not add up to security. In a report of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, of which he is the Director, Mr. Foster wrote:

"As military strength has steadily increased, national security has correspondingly diminished."

Mr. Foster himself quoted here a statement by the late President Kennedy concerning the United States and the Soviet Union:

"For too long both of us have increased our military budgets, our nuclear stockpiles and our capacity to destroy all life ... without any corresponding increase in our security". (A/PV.1209, provisional, p.23)

(Mr. de Araújo Castro, Brazil)

Those are the well-thought-out expressions of a great American and a great statesman who was deeply aware of the dramas of our age.

Everybody seems to agree that the arms race is not conducive to security, that disarmament is essential to the very survival of mankind; yet all the good intentions seem to be of no avail when we come to tangible negotiations, to tackling the real issues. What we need here, as Mrs. Myrdal puts it, is an "intensive discussion of details" (ENDC/PV.160, p.17). We cannot go on and on stating again and again the same general ideas, however valuable they may be. We should recognize, using an expression that Mr. Butler used here in another context, that the time for generalities is over (ENDC/PV.169, p.9). We must tackle concrete items in concrete discussions. We should have more details and fewer generalities.

My delegation has had the opportunity of presenting some views of its own. We still adhere to the view that we might explore forthwith the possibility of extending the interdiction area of the partial test ban treaty so as to include underground tests above a certain -- or uncertain -- kiloton range. By the very text of the treaty the original signatory Powers -- the United States of America, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom -- are pledged to continue negotiations seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all tests of nuclear weapons for all time -- and that is a long time. Furthermore, resolution 1910 (XVIII) -- approved by 104 optimistic votes in the General Assembly -- requested this Conference to continue negotiations towards that goal "with a sense of urgency" (ENDC/116). Can we find here any "sense of urgency" on this matter? What is more serious, can we find any trace of negotiations being carried on?

It seems to my delegation that, once again, we should take the gradual and progressive approach. It is generally recognized that the main stumbling-block to an agreement on the cessation of underground tests lies in the intricate question of control. Yet there may well be certain underground tests above a certain -- or uncertain -- kiloton range likely to be detected and identified by the existing monitoring systems. If that is so, why not add this group of tests to the interdiction area of the Moscow Treaty and then proceed gradually and progressively with such further extensions as might be warranted by scientific progress in detection and identification? Would this not be in keeping with the methodology of the partial treaty negotiations? Our view has always been that partial treaties should be formalized as soon as partial agreement is reached.

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I suggested this approach in a statement on 19 September 1963 at the United Nations General Assembly (A/FV.1208, provisional, pp.8-10 et seq.) and no one, to the best of my knowledge, advanced any clear, valid objection to the idea. However, in fact, from both sides we have had a stony silence and a most discouraging lack of interest. I know there are many technical points involved, and I am always very humble whenever scientific or technical data enter into consideration. At any rate an effort should be made to ascertain whether it is feasible or practical to follow such a path. There is no harm in trying. The exact kiloton limit beyond which explosions would be prohibited is something to be determined with the co-operation of the great Powers, which would rely on their well-known familiarity with explosions.

My delegation has offered other ideas and suggestions for the consideration of this Conference. Extending the idea of a non-aggression pact between the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the countries of the Warsaw Pact, we proposed (ENDC/PV.154, pp.20,21) that a universal pact of non-aggression should be prepared and opened to the signature of every State. We agree that the United Nations Charter is, in fact, itself a non-aggression pact, since it makes illegal the use of force and even the threat of such use. However, the reiteration of that principle in a new political international instrument might have relevant political and psychological consequences. The new pact could be an important element in the process of increasing and consolidating the relaxation of international tension. Why should we not consider this matter in detail?

A few weeks ago my delegation again proposed here (ENDC/126; PV.166, pp.5 et seq.) the establishment of a fund for industrial reconversion and economic development, to be established with the resources made available by cuts in military expenditures. Its creation is closely connected with the idea of economic collective security, another concept Brazil had the occasion to expound at the last session of the General Assembly (A/PV.1208, Provisional, pp.16 et seq.). It would be repetitious to say how scandalous it is for the conscience of man that millions of human beings continue to live -- or rather vegetate -- under conditions of squalor and misery while a tremendous wealth of money and resources, ingenuity and effort is dedicated to the building of war machinery that may in the end destroy all life on earth.

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Our proposal is very simple. I say "our proposal" because the Brazilian delegation formally introduced it; but it is a proposal which, I am sure, gives vent to an earnest desire of the vast majority of all peoples. It is our wish that, whenever reductions are made in military expenditures, part of the resources thus liberated should be made available to the task of peace through development. We are not so ambitious as to seek to use for peace every cent that is taken from preparations for war. We do not even ask for half of the savings obtained through disarmament: we should be satisfied with a fifth — say, 20 per cent — of those savings.

I wish to make it clear that our proposal is not connected with any other. It is not related, for instance, to the proposal (ENDC/123) that military budgets should be compulsorily cut; although that proposal, in our view, deserves careful consideration. What we want is that any reduction in military expenditures, even a voluntary one, be followed by a corresponding increase in the resources made available for development. Our proposal was circulated to the Conference, and I know of no objections raised to it. On the contrary, the general reaction seems, by and large, to have been encouraging. Should we not bring the matter now into more concrete form?

I felt it was my duty to restate briefly our basic positions and specific suggestions; but we are not claiming an absolute priority for the consideration of any of them. This Committee is seized of many important proposals from all its members, and we have a high regard for a good number of those proposals. It is our contention that each of them deserves our full and detailed consideration regardless of its origin and regardless of political or ideological motivations.

What I want to emphasize is that I deem it essential for this Conference to move away from the protracted general debate which has been taking place and move towards the consideration of specific issues. Without losing sight of our goal of general and complete disarmament, we should seek practical, positive, immediate results.

It has been said that that method has a great shortcoming. It has been stated that, if we try it and fail to achieve results on any specific issue, that would jeopardize the whole future of our work. However, rather than try to evade reality, we should be prepared to recognize readily that we have failed on certain specific points.

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The United Kingdom Foreign Secretary, Mr. Butler, recalled here not long ago that disarmament had been compared to a chess game. He added that we played with nuclear weapons and that it was a game of life and death (ENDC/PV.169, p.20). I fully agree, and that is why I feel that the classical rules of diplomacy cannot apply here in their entirety. I know that in diplomacy there are discussions which should not be engaged in, there are confrontations which should be avoided, because we know beforehand that their results cannot be positive. Here, however, there is no room for such limitations.

Every Government represented here is fully aware of its duty, of the task entrusted to it by its own people as well as by every other people in the world. My country which, in a many-sided battle, is now engaged in a tremendous effort for development, has brought to this Conference its modest but earnest contribution. We shall continue to do so without discouragement. The search for disarmament is a search for the peaceful conditions we need in order to improve the lot of our people. We cannot accept the idea that the world must continue to live in the shade of nuclear terror and that there is no peaceful alternative to the present system of intensive military preparations, of the division of the world into opposing groups and antagonistic alliances.

We maintain our faith in the work and in the proceedings of this Committee, which will always receive the unrestricted support of the Brazilian Government. Our people are a peaceful people with an inborn distaste for violence and war. We consider that, notwithstanding our failures and frustrations, the mere fact of the continued functioning of the Disarmament Committee is an auspicious and encouraging factor in itself. If I have spoken frankly, it is because I am a firm believer in this Committee, and it is our aim to strengthen it and increase its possibilities of action. This Committee is living proof that men have not disavowed reason and that survival may not be altogether impossible on our planet.

Here and now, at Geneva, Brazil will carry on the same kind of fight, both in this forum and in the United Nations Conference for Trade and Development which is now opening. We view it essentially as a fight for freedom. At the last session of the General Assembly we made clear our determination to make, to the extent of our possibilities, a sustained diplomatic effort towards disarmament, development and decolonization. At that time we characterized our position in the following manner:

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"Disarmament, development, decolonization, these are the only alternatives to death, starvation and slavery. Because, in everything and above everything, the essential goal is to secure human freedom. In the final analysis man will have gained nothing if he loses his freedom -- freedom to live, to think and to act. For progress and economic development my country will make every sacrifice, yet it will not sacrifice freedom. No idea will be acceptable to us if it brings with it the suppression of human freedom. But as security is today linked to peace, so is the concept of freedom linked to those of social progress and economic development. And we must advance rapidly, for time is running short, both for the United Nations and for mankind." (A/PV.1208, provisional, p.37)

This is a daily struggle for our very lives, and when life is in jeopardy men have to be bold and imaginative; and they are bound to be honest -- both in their words and in their acts, both in their hopes and in their fears.

Mr. LUKANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from Russian): Mr. Chairman, before making some brief observations on the progress of our discussions, I should like to associate myself with your words of welcome to Mr. de Araujo Castro, the Foreign Minister of Brazil, and to Mr. Malitza, the Deputy Foreign Minister of Romania. We warmly welcome the representatives of Brazil and Romania. We listened with great interest to Mr. de Araujo Castro's statement, which we consider certainly merits serious study by our entire Committee.

The Bulgarian delegation was recently accused of seeking to give the Eighteen-Nation Committee an erroneous impression of the Western countries' views on the key issue of disarmament: that of nuclear missile disarmament or, more exactly, the earliest possible elimination of the threat of a nuclear war. On 10 March the Chairman of the Italian delegation made the following observation on our statement:

"The representative of Bulgaria, followed by that of Romania, again sought to give the Committee the impression that the Western delegations were in favour of retaining nuclear weapons as long as possible. However, I am sure the Committee knows that these accusations do not correspond to the facts." (ENDC/PV.173, p.25).

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We appreciate that Mr. Cavallotti was making an impromptu reply to us and, that while thinking it out, he may not have noted the statement made by one of his Western colleagues a few minutes previously. The Committee will recall that Sir Paul Mason criticized (ibid., pp.19 et seq.) the Soviet proposal for a "nuclear umbrella" and said he did not see what sort of an "umbrella" it would be if it did not include Polaris missiles. Sir Paul was at pains to emphasize the ease with which such missiles can be concealed and their suitability for making surprise attacks; at the same time he objected to the retention of anti-missile missiles in the "umbrella" -- that is, missiles which would be used solely over a country's own territory and could not harm others. In short, the United Kingdom representative was then trying to prove the desirability of retaining the capacity to wage nuclear war right to the end of the disarmament process.

Since, however, on another more recent occasion the Italian representative also failed to note what another Western representative had said before him -- I shall come to this later -- and asserted, not on his own behalf but on behalf of all Western delegations, that they are in favour of the earliest possible elimination of the nuclear threat, we should like to go into the matter more closely. If Mr. Cavallotti is right and the Western countries are genuinely in favour of the earliest possible elimination of the threat of a nuclear missile war, then we are not far from agreement. But what is the actual position? Let us look at the facts.

1. The United States proposal "Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World" (ENDC/30 and Corr 1 and Add. 1,2,3), which the Italian delegation supports, provides for the retention not only of nuclear weapons but also of the means for their delivery until a very late stage -- virtually to the end of the entire disarmament process. That is the basic difference between the Soviet and United States proposals: the Soviet proposal (ENDC/2/Rev.1) provides for a different system and is based on a different "philosophy", to quote a term sometimes used in this connexion. While the socialist countries, acting in the interests of the peoples of the world and with their sympathy and support, urge the need to exorcize the spectre of a world nuclear war, the Western States consider it essential to preserve, not merely nuclear weapons, but also the threat of a nuclear war by leaving the nuclear potential of States to all intents and purposes intact.

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2. Since the United States presented its outline of a treaty on disarmament, there has been ample time for the various sides to give a definitive explanation of their positions. The statements made here during the last few weeks by Mr. Butler, Mr. Burns, Mr. Fisher and Mr. Cavalletti show no evidence whatever of a desire for the earliest possible elimination of the nuclear threat. To quote Mr. Butler:

"... a strategically-stable balance of nuclear power has been reached, a balance which it is in the interests of all to see maintained".

(ENDC/PV.169, p.12)

Mr. Burns, in his turn, frankly defined this strategic balance of nuclear power as "... a balance of ... nuclear terror" (ENDC/PV.175, p.17). Although, unlike Mr. Butler, he recognized that "... this is an unstable balance and it can be upset ..." (*ibid.*), he nevertheless concluded that elimination of the means of delivering nuclear weapons and, *pari passu*, the threat of a nuclear war in the initial stage of disarmament is impossible, however desirable it might be. As if to summarize all the arguments used by the Western States during the last two years, Mr. Fisher said that the United States of America worked towards general and complete disarmament in the knowledge that "a rough balance of destructive capability has been reached on both sides". He added:

"... the peace today is a result of this rough balance, and it is the tremendous power of the destructive armaments lying behind this rough balance which impels us to search for better ways to keep the peace ... Our primary efforts should be to safeguard the balance of security as disarmament proceeds." (*ibid.*, p.5)

Lastly, Mr. Cavalletti said:

"The idea was that we should begin by relatively simple steps which could be easily controlled, and then continually develop them afterwards."

(ENDC/PV.173, p.26)

It would be interesting to know who, apart from the Western Powers, always had the idea that a beginning should be made with trivial matters. Does the fact

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that the Western countries hold that opinion really prove its correctness? We shall return later to the words of the United States delegation, but I wish to say here and now that those words and all the facts I have just quoted confirm that we have not been trying to give a false impression of the Western countries' position on the key issue of disarmament; the Western countries are in fact in favour of retaining the capacity to wage nuclear war right to the end of the entire disarmament process.

The opposite position is held not merely by the socialist States, but also by the majority of the countries of the world and, indeed, by many statesmen in the West. I shall merely give the following quotation pertaining to disarmament from the speech made by Mr. Philip Noel-Baker on being presented with the Nobel Peace Prize:

"Some people honestly believe that small steps will be much easier to take than large ones; they quote proverbs to support their point: ... 'The better is the enemy of the good'..."

"I prefer the words of our great economist and political thinker, John Stuart Mill:

'Against a great evil, a small remedy does not produce a small result; it produces no result at all.'

"Or the saying of Lloyd-George:

'The most dangerous thing in the world is to try to leap a chasm in two jumps'.

And Mr. Noel-Baker concludes:

"There is a great chasm, a great gulf, between the armed world of Today and the disarmed world which we must have on some near Tomorrow."

(Les Prix Nobel, 1956-1959, 1378-3, p.961)

Since the point at issue is the necessity and feasibility of removing the threat of a thermonuclear war, Mr. Noel-Baker's proposed approach is indisputably sounder than anything advocated here by the delegations of the Western Powers.

The draft treaty on disarmament proposed by the Soviet Union (ENDC/2/Rev.1 and Add.1) is what this day and age needs, providing as it does for radical measures to remove the threat of a thermonuclear war in the initial stages of disarmament.

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In this connexion, mention must be made of Mr. Burns' arbitrary conclusion that the Soviet proposal for a "nuclear umbrella" constitutes an admission of the impossibility of destroying all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles immediately (ENDC/PV.175, pp.16, 17). We have had occasion to point out that attempts to ascribe to socialist delegations opinions which they have never held do little to promote the Committee's work. That is not the way to prove the existence of agreement where there is none; nor is it the way to conceal the absence of goodwill when there is none.

To return to the point at issue, the "Gromyko proposal" (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1) is not an admission of the impossibility of eliminating the threat of a thermonuclear war; nor is it a concession to common sense, as another Western representative put it; it is an expression of the goodwill of the socialist countries and of their willingness to make acceptable compromises in the cause of peace. When has the West ever shown goodwill and a spirit of compromise? Two years have passed since the Eighteen-Nation Committee began its work, but we still have not seen any such willingness. Particularly characteristic is the Western Powers' attitude to the Soviet "nuclear umbrella" proposal. This proposal in its first version was regarded as a step in the right direction but as not going far enough. Some Western representatives are now trying to convince us that they did not adopt a superficial approach to the Soviet proposal, that they were anxious for a more exhaustive and constructive examination of Mr. Gromyko's proposal. The United States representative, on the other hand, in effect rejects the proposal on the ground that it not only does not lighten the difficulties but even increases them.

The Eighteen-Nation Committee cannot help noticing the inconsistency of those delegations which at one and the same time proclaim their intention of making a constructive study of the Soviet "nuclear umbrella" proposal, and assert that the proposal is unacceptable because it does not meet their requirement that the capacity to wage thermonuclear war should be retained to the end of disarmament. What are we to make of this attitude? Does it reflect a desire to cloak a refusal in references to the need to obtain additional information on

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various technical points or on inspection problems. But what is the point of obtaining detailed information in regard to a proposal which is considered to be unacceptable? And if it is acceptable subject to certain conditions -- that is, to certain detailed requirements -- that should be made clear. At any rate, attempts to give the general public an erroneous impression that the Soviet "nuclear umbrella" proposal is being approached constructively and that, if the talks are making no headway, that is solely due to lack of adequate information on the details of control and inspection -- such attempts, I say, to lead the peoples of the world astray are doomed to failure.

We clearly cannot remain silent on the deadlock in our work. We cannot suppress its real cause: namely, that the United States is countering the Soviet proposal with one for "freezing" the strategic means of delivering nuclear weapons (ENDC/120). This "freeze" is presented to us almost in the guise of the best possible solution to the problem of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in general, and thus to that of eliminating the threat of a thermonuclear war. In other words, the authors of that proposal believe that a "freeze" of the so-called "rough" or "stable" nuclear balance opens up such prospects for the preservation of peace that it would remove the need for disarmament for a long time to come. It is hardly necessary for me to show that an agreement on "freezing" the nuclear "balance" would entail a risk of freezing the negotiations about the main problem -- disarmament -- and thus a risk of freezing disarmament itself. No matter how optimistic we may be, we cannot allow ourselves to be led away from the main task. The Bulgarian delegation considers that such a course is fraught with danger.

There have been many instances in the past of Western representatives repudiating their own proposals as soon as the Soviet Union went some way to meet them. It is to be hoped that those times are past. The attitude of the Western Powers to the many gestures of goodwill made by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries does not engender optimism. If we retrace the history of disarmament negotiations since the Second World War, we can compare the present situation with the situation prevailing, say, in 1955. As we all know, at that time the Soviet Union, desiring to extricate the disarmament negotiations from the deadlock which had existed for many years, went a considerable way in the direction

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of the Western Powers' proposals. But the reaction was as unexpected as it was speedy: the Western Powers stated quite unequivocally that they could no longer support their own proposals.

The consequences of this complete volte-face by the Western States allied in NATO were more than dismal. This stage of the disarmament negotiations is already a matter of historical record and, as many Western governmental and public figures admit, not only was the conduct of the States members of the North Atlantic bloc in 1955 completely unjustified, but, as subsequent events showed, an exceptionally favourable opportunity was missed of taking a decisive step forward in the disarmament talks. In effect, it was not until the Soviet Union made its proposal for general and complete disarmament that fresh life was infused into the talks.

This historical fact is not without significance at the present juncture. Indeed, since the disarmament talks were resumed in this Eighteen-Nation Committee the Soviet Union has made several compromises, solely out of a desire to prevent the talks from again becoming deadlocked. The last such compromise -- the proposal by Mr. Gromyko at the eighteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly (A/PV.1208, provisional, p.71) -- was described as the most substantial and important proposal made at any time since the beginning of the Geneva talks, as a proposal opening up the widest prospects for agreement on one of the key issues of general and complete disarmament. The Eighteen-Nation Committee must not allow this favourable opportunity also to be missed. The position has changed considerably since 1955, and for the better, but the danger threatening humanity has also increased many times over. Hence a repetition of the events of nearly ten years ago might, correspondingly, have far more serious consequences for disarmament and peace.

Sir Paul MASON (United Kingdom): Before I begin the substance of my observations this morning, perhaps I may be allowed to join you, Mr. Chairman, and the representative of Bulgaria who has just spoken, in welcoming here the Brazilian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Romanian Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs. It is, I am sure, a great source of encouragement to us all when distinguished statesmen find time to come and not only to sit with us but also, as Mr. de Araujo Castro has done this morning, to give us the benefit of their experience and their knowledge of these questions.

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

I am sure we all listened with great admiration and profit to the eloquent and thoughtful address of the Brazilian Minister for I reign Affairs. I myself particularly noted the passages in which His Excellency endorsed what was said here not long ago by his colleague, our own Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Butler, on the importance now of trying to get away from general discussion and of trying to reach concrete agreements on concrete matters. The fact that the two Ministers for Foreign Affairs who have found the time during recent months to come and address this Conference have both so largely stressed this point is, I think, something which the Committee might well ponder to its own profit.

This morning I should like to consider again some of the issues raised at recent meetings when the Committee has discussed the problem of reducing and eliminating nuclear delivery vehicles during the disarmament process; and I should like in the course of doing so to refer to what our Soviet colleague has said on these issues, particularly at our 173rd meeting, a fortnight ago, and at our 175th meeting, last Tuesday. I hope also that what I have to say will be found to be relevant, at any rate in part, to some of the observations which Mr. Lukhanov has just made to the Committee.

First of all, I propose to consider the extent to which nuclear delivery vehicles should be destroyed in stage I. That is of course a key issue which has not yet been resolved and which, as our Soviet colleague himself has pointed out, constitutes one of the main differences between the Soviet and the Western positions.

So far as the West is concerned, our position is well known and, I think, quite clear. We propose (ENDC/30, p.4) that nuclear delivery vehicles should be destroyed by a 30 per cent cut "across the board" in what will be only the first of three stages of the disarmament process. We have often explained in the past why a reduction of such a magnitude would, in our view, be a feasible and realistic way of starting on the road towards general and complete disarmament by the end of stage III. This morning I only wish to ask, once again, our Soviet colleague in particular not to underestimate the positive advantages which would be achieved by the end of stage I under the Western proposals.

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

A 30 per cent cut "across the board" in all major armaments -- that is to say, the destruction of almost one-third of all nuclear delivery vehicles and of most conventional armaments -- would reduce the military potential of States, and particularly the military potential of the great Powers, to a very marked extent. It would maintain the present rough balance of destructive power as between East and West, but at a significantly reduced level. Further, such a reduction would, I suggest, contribute to the growth of confidence between States at a time when such confidence would obviously not be fully developed, at a time when so-called radical measures of disarmament would destroy rather than promote confidence, and at a time when the international disarmament organization would have been only just established.

In our view, any attempt to overburden stage I of the disarmament process would be, to use Mr. Butler's word, "unrealistic" (ENDC/PV.169, p.13). That is, as is known, one of the main reasons why we object to the Soviet approach which apparently envisages the destruction of nearly all nuclear delivery vehicles in stage I (ENDC/2/Rev.1 and Add.1). I say "apparently" because, until the Soviet Government can provide us with a more precise idea than has been given hitherto of the number, for example, of nuclear delivery vehicles which under its own proposal would be retained as a nuclear deterrent on both sides during stages II and III, we obviously cannot assess the amount of destruction of nuclear delivery vehicles which would have to be carried out in stage I under the Soviet plan; and, if we cannot assess the amount of destruction envisaged in stage I of the Soviet plan, we clearly cannot even attempt to assess the difference between that amount of destruction and the amount of destruction which we in the West have proposed for the same stage. Therefore, if I may say so, our Soviet colleague's reluctance to elaborate his Government's proposals in this respect hardly helps us to make progress in our negotiations.

I did notice that at our meeting last Tuesday our Soviet colleague told us that --

"... the destruction of ... even 99 per cent of the existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons would not eliminate this terrible threat hanging over mankind." (ENDC/PV.175, p.29)

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

He is there referring, of course, to an all-destructive nuclear war. I do not know if that remark was intended as a hint that the Soviet Government envisaged that 1 per cent or less of existing nuclear weapons should be legally retained under its proposals in stages II and III. If so, I frankly do not think it carries matters much further forward, because many elements in the calculations of the Soviet Government have still not been vouchsafed to us. However, even if we have to make do with the strictly limited amount of information so far available to us, it is clear that what we understand to be the Soviet suggestion is quite unrealistic: namely, that almost all nuclear delivery vehicles should be destroyed in the short time of only eighteen months, the time proposed for stage I under the Soviet plan. As Mr. Butler pointed out on 25 February,

"We are convinced that realistic measures of disarmament which would build up international confidence must be taken first, before we contemplate these extreme steps." (ENDC/PV.169, p.13)

To that I will add that I fear that, so long as the Soviet Government continues to insist on overloading stage I of the disarmament process and on including in that stage various other unacceptable measures, agreement on this vital issue is likely to continue to elude us.

In passing, perhaps I may just say how greatly I enjoyed, as I am sure all my colleagues also enjoyed, the Bulgarian representative's quotation (supra, p.16) of Mr. Lloyd-George's remark about the dangers of trying to leap a chasm in two jumps. I think my reply must be that, on the evidence available, it seems to me that the Soviet Government and its allies are trying to jump across a very wide ditch in one jump -- a process which generally ends with a fall into the water. If that is what they wish to do, that is of course their problem; but the problem of the Conference, it seems to me, is to try to find a way across the ditch or the gap so that we may find ourselves safely and properly on the other side.

I should now like to turn for a moment to the question of the retention or otherwise of sea-borne missiles during the disarmament process. At our meeting last Tuesday our Soviet colleague asserted:

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

"... the Western Powers are ardent advocates of those types of missiles such as the Polaris ..."

-- because, in Mr. Tsarapkin's view, they "are intended for launching secret, uncontrollable, surprise nuclear blows", and also because, in his view, they are "what could be used for aggression". (ENDC/PV.175, p.25)

I confess that I am still puzzled, if not baffled, by our Soviet colleague's attitude towards sea-borne missiles. It seems to me that he forgets that such missiles have characteristics which make them highly suitable as a deterrent or for a retaliatory second-strike purpose. Perhaps I might just explain what I mean. If an aggressor does not know exactly where his victim's sea-borne missiles are, he cannot destroy them. If he cannot destroy them, he knows that he cannot escape what has been called "the nuclear counter-blow" or "the high price" which would punish him for his aggression. In other words, he would be deterred from launching an aggression in the first place.

A potential aggressor is not interested in the invulnerability of his own missiles, for he intends to fire them first. I have said before, and I say again, that any missiles could in theory be used to carry out a surprise nuclear attack. Any nuclear delivery vehicle could be so used. Land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, intermediate-range ballistic missiles, medium-range ballistic missiles -- all those could be used just as easily as sea-borne missiles.

However, if it is intended to use sea-borne missiles as Mr. Tsarapkin suggests, namely to launch a surprise attack, why bother to go to such technically complicated and very expensive lengths by mounting them on concealed mobile platforms? Why bother to make them almost indefinitely mobile, and therefore invulnerable, by making their platforms nuclear-propelled? If an aggressor intends to fire missiles first, he can put them anywhere; he does not have to make them sea-borne. Clearly it would be much cheaper and much less complicated to place them on land. It is only for deterrent or second-strike retaliatory purposes that such elaborate measures are necessary.

I must say, therefore, that I am frankly not impressed by our Soviet colleague's assertion that, whereas land-based missiles are in his view essentially defensive weapons, sea-borne missiles are not. If that is really so, perhaps

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

I might be allowed to ask why the Soviet Government has developed, and is continuing to develop, its own equivalent of the Polaris missile system. If we accept our Soviet colleague's argument at its face value, we can only assume that the Soviet Government has developed and is developing its sea-borne missiles for one purpose and one purpose only: namely to launch a surprise nuclear attack.

Personally I should prefer to assume that the Soviet missile-carrying submarine fleet has a basically defensive purpose and is primarily intended as an invulnerable second-strike retaliatory nuclear force. I hope our Soviet colleague can confirm that view. If so, I hope that he will accept the fact that equivalent fleets in the West are equally defensive; that they have a similar deterrent purpose; and that they represent an important contribution to the present balance of nuclear power and therefore to the maintenance of peace between the nuclear Powers.

Therefore, if the Soviet Government really wishes to ensure that during the process of disarmament States and their deterrent forces will be protected, I venture to hope that it will think further about the invulnerability of the deterrent forces to be retained until the end of stage III, rather than jeopardize their effectiveness and the certainty of retaliation against an aggressor by excluding sea-borne missiles from the deterrent forces.

Finally, I should like to make a few further remarks about anti-missile missiles. The Conference will have noted that at our meeting on 17 March our Soviet colleague had no substantive comments to offer about some considerations which I had myself put forward on this subject on 10 March (ENDC/PV.173, pp.22-24). However, Mr. Tsarapkin did tell us a fortnight ago that --

"... in the event of anyone daring to unleash a war ... if a country possesses anti-missile missiles, it can defend itself against attack." (ibid., p.29)

I had always understood that the purpose of the retention of a limited number of intercontinental ballistic missiles, under Mr. Gromyko's proposal, was precisely to deter any such act of aggression in the first place. Our Soviet colleague has assured us on more than one occasion, and notably on 4 February that --

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

"It is impossible to imagine that, if a 'nuclear umbrella' existed, any State would venture to violate peace and embark on aggression. The aggressor would have to pay a high price for such an act." (ENDC/PV.163, p.21)

That being so, why does our Soviet colleague insist that what he calls "additional guarantees", in the form of anti-missile missiles, are required? I believe that most of us in this Committee increasingly realize that a unilateral technological break-through in the field of anti-missile defence could be extremely dangerous for the security of States and the stability of peace, however remote such a break-through may seem at present. I do not think we can altogether ignore the possibility of some major development in anti-missile defence in the future.

Our Soviet colleague argued that anti-missile missiles were purely defensive. I take his point, but I submit that the question is not quite so simple as he suggests. I have had the opportunity to explain on various occasions that if one side but not the other were to develop an effective anti-missile defence system before the disarmament treaty came into effect, that would, by a paradox, give the first side much greater freedom to threaten -- or indeed actually to launch -- nuclear aggression. In that situation the side which did not possess such a defence system could obviously not be expected to regard the development of such a system by the first side as purely defensive in character.

I believe we ought to think further about the situation which I have described, and which indeed might arise under the Soviet Government's proposals -- that is to say, a situation in which a potential aggressor, but not his victim, would possess effective anti-missile missiles and would be able, therefore, to unleash a nuclear attack, perhaps later in the disarmament process, with the intercontinental ballistic missiles he would be allowed to keep in stages II and III under the Soviet plan. As I said on 10 March, a potential aggressor could unleash such an attack, or could threaten to do so, in the knowledge that he would not have to pay a high price for such aggression, because his anti-missile missiles could ward off the potential victim's retaliatory nuclear blow (ENDC/PV. 173, p.23).

While on this subject, I note that over seven years ago the famous Soviet physicist Academician Peter Kapitza, writing in the Soviet weekly journal New Times, dated 20 September 1956, stated:

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

"... that if effective defence against nuclear weapons is achieved by any aggressively-minded country, or that is sure it is protected against the consequences of nuclear weapons, it may decide more easily on unleashing atomic war."

Academician Kapitza went on to say that the countries which are the first to discover an effective means of defence against nuclear weapons -- and here I quote him again:

"... may 'forget' any pledges they may have given. They may either launch atomic war or, at any rate, utilize their advantage to impose their will upon other countries".

Those two quotations from Academician Kapitza's article seem to me admirably to sum up the point which I have been trying to make today and at our 173rd meeting. I think they provide an answer to the remarks of our Soviet colleague on that point. I also think they provide a conclusive argument in favour of President Johnson's proposal (ENDC/120) that the freeze should include in its scope, among other things, anti-ballistic missile systems.

The CHAIRMAN (India): With your permission, I should like now to make a statement on behalf of the delegation of India.

As our Prime Minister has stated on many occasions, disarmament is the most urgent and vital problem facing humanity today. In the uncertain and unstable conditions of the present -- political, economic, military and social -- disarmament is concerned with the question of the survival of our civilization, and it is essential that the international community should pursue its efforts vigorously towards achieving a speedy solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament and of the security of mankind.

To be sure, disarmament is not an end in itself but a means to an end. In the context of the present-day piling-up of armaments, the multiple saturation of nuclear weapons, and the continuing quest for more lethal and more effective instruments of warfare, the objective of a peaceful, progressive and just world is impossible of realization unless the world is first disarmed. The goal we seek is that of peace and equality, of justice and economic progress, of security and development. That is the end to which disarmament is an inescapable means.

(The Chairman, India)

As we all know, the Secretary-General of the United Nations yesterday inaugurated in this building one of the epoch-making gatherings of our time. Trade and development also form an important means to the ultimate human objective of peace and plenty, of justice and security. The economic development of developing nations is closely linked with the issues which we discuss in our Committee. Our colleague from Brazil, Mr. de Castro, has spoken eloquently of the direct interrelation between the two (ENDC/PV.166, pp. 5 et seq.). Again this morning the Foreign Minister of Brazil, Mr. de Araújo Castro, referred to that issue in his cogent and constructive statement. In fact, viewing the problem from the angle stressed by the Foreign Minister of Brazil, the interrelation between those two aspects of international endeavour is very profound and far-reaching. The menace posed by poverty, ignorance and disease is no less threatening than the nuclear menace that we face today. We have been talking in our Committee of the multi-megaton bombs, but the biggest and most dangerous bomb of them all is poverty and inequality.

We in the Disarmament Committee are thus negotiating the implementation of a very important means to the ultimate objective of mankind, and it is necessary to view our efforts from that criterion. It is in that context, therefore, that the Indian delegation views the significant proposal made by Mr. Gromyko (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1) for a reduction and eventual elimination of the nuclear menace. We are all agreed that real and lasting security can be provided by general and complete disarmament, by elimination of poverty from every corner of the globe, by establishment of a just and egalitarian society, and by the rule of law. At the same time, every proposal which courageously and constructively deals with the problem of disarming the world merits our full and sympathetic consideration. At the eighteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly (A/PV.1239, provisional, p.46) Mrs. Pandit, the leader of the Indian delegation, spoke of the significance of the "nuclear umbrella" proposal in the context of disarmament. In our own Committee, speaking on 31 January, Mr. Nehru similarly described that proposal as an important contribution (ENDC/PV.162, p.13). Other delegations, including those of the Western Powers, have welcomed the positive aspects of the advance made by the Soviet Union in the new plan.

(The Chairman, India)

The Gromyko proposal envisages a substantial reduction of the existing nuclear arms potential in the world in the initial stage of the actual process of disarmament, and the maintenance of a balance of nuclear security with the retention under control by the United States and the Soviet Union of a strictly limited number of agreed types of missiles until the end of disarmament.

I believe all of us accept that disarmament will lead to international security and that, in consonance with that proposition, the menace of nuclear arms has to be eliminated on a priority basis. The Gromyko plan is postulated on that premise. Some delegations have raised several pertinent questions on the details of the plan and on the need to satisfy certain basic considerations if the plan is to be acceptable. The Committee has been having an exhaustive debate on those issues during this session, and that has led to additional clarifications. At this stage, therefore, it appears to me that our work could be speeded up significantly and without affecting the position of anyone if we could say that in principle we viewed the "nuclear umbrella" proposal favourably. We could then all go on to a detailed examination of the plan. The Indian delegation realizes, of course, that all delegations will need to be satisfied with the details before final agreement can be reached.

During the last few meetings the Soviet delegation and other socialist delegations have been elaborating the basic features of the Gromyko plan, and the Western delegations have been specifying the problems which they consider to be the disadvantages of the plan. In that context I think it might be useful, from the point of view of the two sides as well as that of the non-aligned delegations, if the "nuclear umbrella" principle were accepted. Such acceptance could well break the circumscribing circle in which we find ourselves today.

I hope I shall be forgiven at this stage if I quote a relevant paragraph from the final communiqué of the 12th Pugwash Conference. The Pugwash scientists said: "The concept of a nuclear umbrella or minimum deterrent force, which we have been discussing in our conferences since 1960, to be maintained by the two great nuclear Powers during the process of general and complete disarmament, is of major importance in providing the necessary guarantee against aggression by hidden weapons. We welcome the proposal of the USSR to extend it to the end of the disarmament process. We regard the

(The Chairman, India)

possibility of agreement on the principles of a nuclear umbrella or minimum deterrent force to offer one of the most hopeful avenues to reach agreement on comprehensive disarmament under effective controls."

This does not mean, of course, that our debate would not proceed more or less on the lines on which it has proceeded so far. It does mean, however, that we could now have more meaningful and more detailed discussions. In his able and penetrating analysis at our meeting on 17 March, Mr. Burns said that as yet the Committee had not received an indication of what was meant in exact figures by the phrases a "strictly limited" number, or a "definite, limited number", or a "minimum quantity" (ENDC/PV.175, p.21). Such a definition, we presume, would be forthcoming once the principle were accepted.

The Western delegations have raised other pertinent points. Mr. Cavalletti said that there were three series of problems: balance, control and peace organization (ENDC/PV.175, p.37). At one of our recent meetings Sir Paul Mason said that there were four problems still to be resolved: agreement on the size of the deterrent, agreement on the nature of the deterrent, differences on the rate and phasing of the reductions, and peace-keeping arrangements (ENDC/PV.171, pp.8-10). At our meeting last Tuesday Mr. Fisher listed five disadvantages of the Gromyko plan: those relating to imbalance, verification, linking of proposals, peace-keeping machinery and the philosophy of the threat of war (ENDC/PV.175, pp.6 *et seq.*). Some of those problems are of a fundamental nature and will need to be debated further, but in so far as they relate to the question of detail, I think we should be taking a useful and constructive step if we proceeded on the basis of the "nuclear umbrella" thesis.

What is even more important is that, once we proceed on that basis, it is possible that we may come to some agreed elaborations on the plan. That, in fact, is the purpose of all negotiation. If, for example, a hypothetical number of ten, or a similar figure, as the agreed number of missiles, is found to be inadequate because of considerations of international security, a higher figure could be suggested, negotiated and finally agreed upon. Again, Mr. Tsarapkin explained to us last Tuesday that, under the Gromyko plan as formulated, hidden missiles hardly presented a problem (*ibid.*, p.27). On the other hand, the Western delegations are greatly concerned with such a risk. Once the "nuclear umbrella" thesis is accepted, however, and once we go into details, I think that the greater understanding of the Gromyko plan which will inevitably ensue may lead to a narrowing of the gap between the two sides on this question.

(The Chairman, India)

The Indian delegation is particularly interested in the question of security. As I said earlier in my statement, we view the issue of disarmament in the framework of international security. The Gromyko proposal for the "nuclear umbrella" has also to be viewed in the same context. Mr. Tsarapkin has emphasized on several occasions that the Gromyko proposal provides security for peace while at the same time it reduces the menace of a nuclear war.

The representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, pointed out last Tuesday (ibid., p.17) that it was also necessary to consider in this context the importance of avoiding the possibility of a conventional war. It is true that a nuclear war means universal annihilation, and we must do all we can to make it possible to eliminate this danger as quickly as possible. At the same time, we must also bear in mind the consideration that our efforts should not in any way give wrong notions to military adventurists in the world to commit aggression against their neighbours by conventional forces. The answer to this problem is, of course, not to discard the "nuclear umbrella" thesis but to ensure in our discussions and our negotiations that the plan which we finally agree upon maintains international security.

As I said earlier, the queries raised by various delegations are being debated in our Committee. The particular issue of security and danger of aggression by conventional arms will also be covered in the debate. I should like to repeat, however, that this particular problem need raise no obstacle in considering the Gromyko plan in greater detail. It could well be met, for example, by stipulating that all nations, and in particular all militarily-significant nations, should adhere to the treaty on general and complete disarmament and implement its provisions right from the commencement of the process of disarmament. Then, again, it will be necessary to ensure the simultaneous compliance by all States with agreed limits of conventional manpower. At the same time, there should be agreement on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, as suggested by me at our meeting on 12 March (ENDC/PV.174, p.20). In fact, such an agreement should be arrived at now.

It is not my intention at this stage to go into the merits of the various queries and their answers. We shall have occasion to deal with them in detail as our debate proceeds further. The purpose of my intervention today is to state that the delegation of India views with favour the principle contained in the Gromyko

(The Chairman, India)

proposal for a "nuclear umbrella" and to suggest that the Committee's discussions will proceed more fruitfully if this thesis is accepted by us all. This need not mean the abandonment for ever of any other thesis, which may be revived, if necessary, at a later stage.

At the beginning of our proceedings this morning, while welcoming the Foreign Minister of Brazil, I said that we were looking forward to another of his outstanding interventions in our Committee. The cogent and forceful statement he made this morning has fully satisfied our hope. It appears to me that the suggestion I have made in respect of our work in the future is along the general lines put forward by Mr. de Araújo Castro. He said:

"We must tackle concrete items in concrete discussions.

We should have more details and fewer generalities." (supra, p.9)

Mr. FISHER (United States of America): I should like to make a short intervention primarily to welcome to our meeting this morning the Foreign Minister of Brazil and the Deputy Foreign Minister of Romania.

We welcome Mr. de Araújo Castro not only as his country's Foreign Minister but also as Brazil's former representative to this Conference and therefore a close neighbour of the United States both at this table and in the Western hemisphere. Foreign Minister de Araújo Castro has indicated by his personal participation in the Committee's work the deep interest of his Government in our discussions, and we are most appreciative of that fact. We shall consider his statement with interest and give it our most careful study.

The Deputy Foreign Minister of Romania also is no stranger to us here, and we share the pleasure of all at this table in welcoming the renewed participation in our work of Mr. Malitza.

I should like to observe, too, that I have listened with great interest to the thoughtful interventions by speakers this morning. I cannot find myself in agreement with all that they said, but I am glad to notice that some of the problems we are facing in this area are recognized, and I propose to study these also with great care.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): We have heard this morning several speeches which are undoubtedly of great importance and interest, and in particular that of the Brazilian Foreign Minister, to whom I extend the friendliest greetings -- our friendship began, I believe, in 1962 when he participated in this Conference as Brazilian Ambassador -- and the statement you made yourself, Mr. Chairman. These statements deserve the most thorough study, which my delegation will undertake with the greatest pleasure, fully realizing their value and constructiveness.

But I should like this morning to put forward a few very brief observations in reply to the statement made by the representative of Bulgaria, Mr. Lukyanov. I followed his statement with great interest, particularly when he examined certain passages from one of my earlier speeches. I must say that I was at first a little nervous when Mr. Lukyanov attempted to show that I had contradicted the United Kingdom representative, or when he seemed to imply that I had not listened to his statement. I really should not like to get into trouble with my friend Sir Paul Mason, or to cause a breach between Italian and British policy. I am sure that was not Mr. Lukyanov's intention.

Later on, when Mr. Lukyanov tried to show that I had contradicted myself, I felt reassured. That is also possible, but it is a little more difficult. Mr. Lukyanov was good enough to quote certain passages from my earlier remarks in which I spoke of balance and of the need for a progressive approach towards the elimination of the means for atomic war; and he also quoted several statements by representatives of other Western Powers. I am grateful to Mr. Lukyanov for quoting our remarks at such length, because I believe that these remarks, as he quoted them, make it clear that I am in contradiction neither with myself nor with my Western colleagues. In spite of the few comments that Mr. Lukyanov thought fit to make on his quotations from the speeches of the representatives of the Western Powers, the Western position was clearly brought out by those quotations.

We are in favour of the complete and speediest possible elimination of nuclear weapons during the process of general and complete disarmament, on condition that it can take place without upsetting the balance -- not the "so-called balance", as Mr. Lukyanov put it, but simply the balance -- and that it is accompanied by the application of the necessary controls. Our preoccupation with balance and control is neither futile nor artificial, and is not a pretext; it corresponds to the real needs recognized by the United Nations and directly connected with something of basic importance: the maintenance of peace.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

It is not, therefore, a question of whether we want, but whether we are able, to eliminate nuclear vehicles rapidly and completely. To be able to do this, we must find methods -- realistic and concrete methods -- which will ensure balance and guarantee control. We ask our Eastern partners to collaborate with us in seeking such methods, being quite certain that the "Eight" -- as Mr. de Araújo Castro called them this morning -- will wish to participate in this task. Your speech this morning, Mr. Chairman, is further proof of this.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): The delegation of the Soviet Union wishes to associate itself with the words of welcome extended by the Chairman and other representatives to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Brazil, Mr. de Araújo Castro, who is well known to us from the direct part he has taken in the Committee's work in the past. I should also like to welcome the representative of Romania, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Malitza, who is also well acquainted with the work of this Committee, having also taken a direct part in its work in the past.

The Soviet delegation notes with satisfaction that the statement by the Foreign Minister of Brazil contains a number of ideas, views and proposals that are interesting and, in our opinion, useful to our discussion, and that will no doubt play a positive role. This statement will certainly be studied very closely by the Soviet delegation, and I am sure that we shall have more than one occasion in the future to refer to the points that have been raised today by the Foreign Minister of Brazil.

We particularly welcome the proposal made by the representative of India at today's meeting that the Committee should accept the Soviet proposal for the elimination, in the first stage of disarmament, of all means of delivering nuclear weapons except a strictly limited and agreed number of missiles retained as a supplementary guarantee of the security of States till the end of the third stage of disarmament. This proposal by the representative of India is of real assistance to our discussion and its acceptance will enable us to work out, on the basis of the Soviet proposal, all the necessary detailed provisions with regard both to the substance of the matter -- for instance, agreement on the number of missiles to be retained -- and to particular aspects of control over the implementation of this measure.

The CHAIRMAN (India): If no other representative wishes to speak, I should like before going on to our communiqué to interject a personal note. I am returning to India tomorrow, and I should like to take leave of you and to thank you most warmly for all the co-operation you have given me and all the kindness you have shown me during my short participation in this Committee. Thank you again.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 177th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Mr. V.C. Trivedi, representative of India.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Brazil, Bulgaria, the United Kingdom, India, the United States, Italy and the Soviet Union.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 26 March 1964, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.20 p.m.